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PRAYER, PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE SUPREME COURT

Paul G. Kauper*
reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Engel v.
Vitale,1 decided in June 1962 and holding invalid a nonsectarian prayer prescribed for use in the public schools of the
State of New York, made clear that the decision had touched a
vital and sensitive spot in the national life.2 Unfavorable response
to the holding ranged from intemperate and abusive denunciation of the Court as Godless to more thoughtful and reflective
criticism that was directed to various considerations such as that
the Court in interpreting the first amendment had failed to give
due weight to the place of religion in American tradition and life,
had misinterpreted the original meaning and purpose of this
amendment, had conferred a constitutional blessing upon secularism as the official American orthodoxy, and had unduly subordinated the majority will and the community consensus to the
sentiments and wishes of a small minority. Some, while not disturbed by the result reached with respect to the problem immediately before the Court, saw large and portentous implications in
the decision. Did it mean that the Constitution forbade not only
religious practices in the public schools but also any consideration
of religion in public school programs? And did it mean that all
acknowledgments of Deity on official occasions was forbidden?
Not all of the immediate reaction to Engel was critical. Secularists and strict separationists hailed the decision as adding strength
to the wall of separation between church and state, while others
applauded the decision as a further contribution to religious freedom. Moreover, much of the initial criticism was dissipated when
UBLIC
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• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
2 For some expression of opinion, see 108 CoNG. REc. 11002-08 (daily ed. June 27,
1962); 108 id. 10883-86, 10897-98 (daily ed. June 26, 1962); Editorial, Roundup on Prayer
Case, America, July 28, 1962, p. 541; N.Y. Times, July 1, 1962, § 4, p. 9, cols. 1-6; id.,
June 28, 1962, p. 1, col. 4, p. 17, cols. 1-3; id., June 27, 1962, p. 1, col. 8, p. 20, col. 3;
id., June 26, 1962, p. 1, cols. 6-8, p. 16, col. 7. See also Kurland, The Regents' Prayer
Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying •••", 1962 SUPREME CouRT REv. 1, 2.
1
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the Court's full opinion was read and understood. A substantial
part of the press and a number of religious leaders and groups
announced their support of the decision as one which, by restricting the state's power to intervene in the sensitive area of prayer,
thereby advanced and protected the liberty of both the believer
and the non-believer.3 Also, some who supported the holding
asserted that it did not outlaw all recognition of religion in the
public schools and had nothing to say whatever about acknowledgment of Deity in public pronouncements and on official occasions.
The decision did not make God an outlaw so far as the national
life was concerned. Likewise, any larger implications of the case
with respect to the use of public funds or property to aid religious
activities were attributable not to the majority opinion but to
Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion.
A more complete understanding of the case, while doing much
to temper the initial outburst of disapproval, did not by any means
dispel all criticism of the decision or allay all the apprehensions
aroused by it. Believing that the Supreme Court's opinion was
premised on a fundamentally erroneous interpretation of the
establishment clause of the first amendment, Bishop James A.
Pike headed a movement to amend the Constitution so as to restore what he regarded as the true and intended meaning of its
pertinent language.4 In the meantime, the Supreme Court has
agreed to review and has heard argument on cases dealing with
the constitutionality of Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's
Prayer in public schools. 5 The decisions in these cases may be ex3 See, e.g., Editorial, Prayer is Personal, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1962, p. 34, col. l;
Editorial, The Christian Century, July 4, 1962, p. 832; Miller, True Piety and the
Regents' Prayer, The Christian Century, Aug. 1, 1962, p. 934; Ruling on Prayer Upheld
by Rabbis, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1962, p. 48, col. 3; Statement of 46 Protestant Clergymen,
Time, Aug. 24, 1962, p. 40.
4 Bishop Pike proposed before the Senate Judiciary Committee that the first amendment be amended to read as follows: "Congress will make no law respecting the recognition, as an established church, of any denomination, sect or other religious association." For a statement of his views, see Debate by William J. Butler and the Rt. Rev.
James A. Pike, Has the Supreme Court Outlawed Religious Observance in the Schools?,
Reader's Digest, Oct. 1962, pp. 78-85. Bishop Pike declared that the Supreme Court's
decision in effect "deconsecrates not merely the schools but the nation." Id. at 79.
For discussion and criticism of Bishop Pike's interpretation of the original and intended meaning of the establishment clause, see Smylie, The First Amendment and
Bishop Pike, The Christian Century, Oct. 31, 1962, pp. 1316-18.
Some fifty-odd proposals to amend the Constitution in order to overcome the result
of the Engel decision were introduced in the House of Representatives and in the Senate
of the United States. For a brief discussion of several of these proposals, see Sutherland,
Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARv. L. R.Ev. 25, 50-52 (1962).
5 The cases under review are Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698, cert.
granted, 371 U.S. 809 (1962), in which the Maryland Court of Appeals had sustained
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pected to result in resumption of the public debate sparked by
Engel. 6
I. THE NEW YoRK TRIAL CouRT's OPINION
The facts of the Engel case are simply stated.7 A local public
school board, acting on the recommendation of the New York
Board of Regents, 8 adopted a resolution directing the daily recitation of the following prayer which the Board had composed for
this purpose:
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee,
and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers
and our country."
The prayer was to be recited at the beginning of the school day,
following the pledge of allegiance to the flag. The school board's
regulation made no allowance for students who objected to participation, but the board did provide in an instruction that was
not incorporated in its resolution or otherwise publicized that
no child was to be required or encouraged to join in the prayer
against his or her wishes. Only one request that a child be excused
from saying the prayer was received in the schools of the district,
which request was respected; and no child had directly asked to
be excused from joining in the prayer, nor had either a parent
or a child sought permission for a child to leave the classroom
during the saying of the prayer. The petitioners, who were taxpayers of the school district and parents of children in the schools
of the district and whose group included Jews, Unitarians, members of the Society of Ethical Culture, and one non-believer, after
the constitutionality of the Maryland school commissioner's rule requiring the daily
reading of one chapter of the Bible and/or daily recital of the Lord's Prayer in
public schools; Schempp v. School Dist., 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa.), prob. juris. noted,
371 U.S. 807 (1962), a decision of a federal three-judge court holding unconstitutional a
Pennsylvania statute requiring ten verses of the Bible to be read daily in public
schools and also the school district's practice of mass recitation of the Lord's Prayer.
Argument on these cases was heard on February 28 and March 1, 1963.
6 For discussion of the legal aspects of the Engel decision, see Ball, The Forbidden
Prayer, The Commonwealth, July 27, 1962, p. 419; Kurland, supra note 2; Pfeffer, StateSponsored Prayer, The Commonwealth, July 27, 1962, p. 417; Pfeffer, Court, Constitution
and Prayer, 16 RUTGERS L. REv. 735 (1962); Smylie, supra note 4; Sutherland, supra note
4; 12 DE PAUL L. REv. 128 (1962); 31 FORDHAM L. REv. 201 (1962); 51 GEO. L.J. 179
(1962); 37 TuL. L. REv. 124 (1962); 24 U. Prrr. L. REv. 179 (1962).
7 The complete statement appears in the opinion of the trial court in Engel v.
Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
s The recommendation with respect to the prayer was part of a total program set
forth in the Regents' Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools, adopted
November 30, 1951. In 1955, this statement was supplemented by the Regents' Recommendations for School Programs on America's Moral and Spiritual Heritage.
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an unsuccessful demand upon the school board that the daily
prayer practice be terminated, brought a proceeding in a New
York court for a mandatory order directing that the prayer practice be discontinued. Asserting that the use of this official prayer
in the public schools was contrary to the beliefs, religions, or
religious practices of both themselves and their children, they
contended that the state's action, both in authorizing the use of
this prayer and in ordering its daily recitation by children in public school classrooms, was unconstitutional. Reliance was placed
upon the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of
the United States and upon the provisions of the New York constitution guaranteeing the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
and forbidding public aid to a school in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught.
It is unfortunate that all the attention riveted on the final
opinion in the case by the United States Supreme Court has
served to obscure the opinion by Justice Meyer of the New York
trial court.9 It was an extraordinarily able, thorough and scholarly
opinion which did more to illuminate the problems and issues
of the case than any other opinions at further stages of the litigation. The gist of the trial court's holding may be briefly stated
before we take a closer look at the judge's opinion. He held
that the prayer exercise did not violate that clause of the first
amendment protecting the free exercise of religion so long as the
school board established procedures designed to assure voluntariness of participation in the prayer practice by protecting
those who objected to saying the prayer, and found also that it
did not constitute an establishment of religion as forbidden by the
first amendment. He further found that the prayer practice was
not "denominational" within the meaning of the New York constitution and emphasized that this was a prayer exercise and not
religious instruction in any real sense of the word. While he
denied the petitioners the relief they had requested, he did direct
the school board to adopt and publicize regulations stating the
rules to be observed with respect to the rights of non-participants.
He recommended for this purpose the regulation adopted by the
New York City Board of Education, which made clear that neither
teachers nor any school authority could comment on participation
or non-participation in the exercise or suggest or require any par9

Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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ticular posture, language, or dress in connection with recitation
of the prayer. Non-participation could take the form either of
remaining silent during the exercise, or, if the parent or child so
desired, of being excused altogether from the exercise. He recommended that the regulations provide that prayer participants could
proceed to a common assembly while non-participants attended
other rooms, or that non-participants would be permitted to arrive at school a few minutes late or attend separate opening exercises, or authorize any other procedure which assured equal freedom for both participants and non-participants.
The heart of the trial court's extensive and well-documented
opinion dealt with the issues raised under the first amendment
as made applicable to the states by means of the fourteenth amendment. Stating as a fundamental rule of interpretation that the
meaning of a constitutional amendment is to be determined by
the "sense of the nation" at the time of its adoption, Justice
Meyer, after reviewing historical practices and pointing out that
prayer and Bible reading in public schools have been common
American practices, concluded that prayer recitation in public
schools did not violate the fourteenth amendment as construed
by the sense of the nation when this amendment was adopted in
1868. Recognizing, however, that the Supreme Court had held
that the first amendment applies to the states by means of the
fourteenth amendment, the trial court found no violation of the
free exercise clause so long as the right of objectors not to participate in the prayer exercise was adequately protected. So far
as the establishment clause was concerned, the court again relied upon historical practice and understanding to demonstrate
the sense of the nation that recitation of prayers in public life
was not "an establishment of religion" in the sense used in the
Constitution or as understood by men such as Jefferson or Madison. Nor did the trial court find that the Supreme Court's opinions
interpreting the establishment language required a different result. In the end it placed chief reliance upon the holding and
opinion in the Zorach 10 case in concluding that some form of
prayer would fall within the realm of permissible accommodation
of the public school system to the religious needs of the nation. 11
In weighing the reasons for including this kind of prayer
exercise in the public school program, the trial court concluded
10
11

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, 693-94, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 490-91 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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that it could not be justified on the ground that this was a means
of familiarizing students with the religious nature of our heritage
since there are other equally effective and constitutionally uninhibited means of achieving that end. Moreover, it could not be
justified on the ground that the state could prescribe exercises
designed to inculcate in pupils a love of God or to teach "spiritual
values," since an exercise directed to such purposes would constitute religious instruction in violation of the establishment
clause and in violation of the parents' right to control the education of his child. However, the court concluded that the recognition of prayer as an integral part of our national heritage was
demonstrated by practices widely accepted at the time of the
adoption of the first and the fourteenth amendments and that,
therefore, these constitutional provisions could not have been intended to prohibit prayer in public schools any more than in
other aspects of public life. 12
In summary, the trial court concluded that, since the :first and
fourteenth amendments should be construed with reference to
the "sense of the nation" at the time of their adoption and since
recognition of prayer was an integral part of our national heritage,
prayer in public schools did not constitute an establishment of
religion and did not violate religious freedom so long as the regulations made clear that student participation in the prayer exercise was a voluntary matter and adequate provision was made for
those children desiring not to participate.
The trial court's decision was affirmed on appeal by the New
York appellate courts.13 Their opinions rested on substantially
the same grounds as those stated more extensively in the trial
court's opinion. Judges Dye and Fuld of the New York Court of
Appeals dissented on the ground that the prayer exercise violated
the establishment clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Everson14 and McCollum. 15

II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINIONS

The Supreme Court of the United States on review of the case
reversed the decision of the New York Court of Appeals and found
the prayer practice unconstitutional because it constituted an esId. at 673, 191 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
Engel v. Vitale, 11 App. Div. 2d 340, 206 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1960), afj'd, 10 N.Y.2d
174, 176 N.E.2d 579, 218 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1961).
14 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947).
15 McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
12
13
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tablishment of religion in violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments. 16 The case was decided by a seven-man court, Justices Frankfurter and White not participating in the decision.
The majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Black received the
support of Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan, Clark
and Harlan. Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in a separate opinion
and Mr. Justice Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion.
At the outset, Mr. Justice Black stated the Court's conclusion
that New York "by using its school system to encourage recitation of the Regents' prayer ... has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause." 17 In passages of the
opinion that followed he stated that there was no doubt that the
New York program of daily classroom invocation of God's blessings was a religious activity, that counsel was correct in asserting
that the use of prayer to further religious beliefs breached the
constitutional wall of separation between church and state, and
that the constitutional prohibition "must at least mean that in
this country it is no part of the business of government to compose
official prayers for any group of American people to recite as a
part of a religious program carried on by government." 18
In building up his case on the significance of the first amendment's establishment clause in its application to the prayer situation, Mr. Justice Black drew upon the history of practices in
England whereby Parliament, in asserting control over the established Church of England and over the Church's Book of Common Prayer, determined what prayers should be included in this
book. Objections to this practice led some people to come to this
country to find religious freedom, and in England the control by
Parliament over prayer led to competition of various groups to
secure approval of their particular form of prayer. Mr. Justice
Black then stated that many of those who came to this country
to find religious freedom in turn established their official religions
and were equally intolerant and oppressive. Nevertheless, intensive opposition to the practice of establishing religion by law followed in the wake of the Revolutionary War. This movement
crystallized rapidly into an effective opposition that eventually
led to the enactment of the famous "Virginia Bill for Religious
Liberty," by which all religious groups were placed on an equal
footing so far as the state was concerned. By the time, then, that
16
17
18

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
Id. at 424.
Id. at 425.
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the Constitution was adopted there was widespread awareness
among many Americans of the danger of a union of church and
state-the danger to the freedom of the individual to worship in
his own way when government places its stamp of approval on one
particular kind of prayer, and the bitter strife that comes when
zealous religious groups struggle to obtain the government's approval from each ruler that may temporarily come to power. The
first amendment to the Constitution was added as a guarantee
that neither the power nor the prestige of the federal government
would be used to control, support or influence the kinds of prayer
the American people can say.
Mr. Justice Black then stated there could be no doubt that
the New York school prayer program officially established the
religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer and so violated
the establishment clause of the first amendment which is operative
against the states also "by virtue of the fourteenth amendment." 19
It was immaterial that the prayer was "non-denominational" or
that the observance of prayer practice by students was voluntary.
Voluntarism might free the prayer from objections under the free
exercise clause but not from the establishment clause. The two
clauses, even though they overlap, forbid two quite different kinds
of "encroachment upon religious freedom." 20 The establishment
clause does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental
compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion, whether these laws operate directly to
coerce non-observing individuals or not. But at this point Mr.
Justice Black saw fit to inject that this is not
"to say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a particular
form of religious worship do not involve coercion of individuals. When the power, prestige and financial support of
government is placed behind a particular religious belief,
the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to
conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is
plain." 21
But, continued Mr. Justice Black, the purposes underlying the
establishment clause go much farther than that. Its first and most
immediate purpose is grounded on the belief that a union of
government and religion tends to destroy government and to
10
20
21

Id. at 430.
Ibid.
Id. at 430-31.
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degrade religion. Another purpose rests upon an awareness of the
fact that governmentally established religion and religious persecution go hand in hand.
Denying that this application of the Constitution to prohibit
state laws respecting an establishment of religious services in public schools indicated a hostility to religion or toward prayer, Mr.
Justice Black, noting that the history of man is inseparable from
the history of religion and also that men of faith in the power of
prayer led the fight for adoption of the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights, concluded:
"It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each
separate government in this country should stay out of the
business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave
that purely religious function to the people themselves and to
those the people choose to look to for religious guidance."22
Referring to the argument that the Regents' prayer did not
amount to a total establishmefl.t of one particular religion and that
governmental endorsement of this prayer was relatively insignificant when compared with the governmental encroachments upon
religions which were commonplace two hundred years ago, Mr.
Justice Black quoted the following words from James Madison,
whom he described as "the author of the first amendment":
"It is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our
liberties .... Who does not see that the same authority which
can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions,
may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? That the same authority
which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of
his property for the support of any one establishment, may
force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases
whatsoever?" 23
Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in a separate opinion in which
he premised his whole case on the argument that government cannot constitutionally finance a religious exercise. He made clear
that in his opinion there was no element of compulsion or coercion involved in the New York prayer practice. But he condemned
New York's action because it financed a religious exercise and went
22
23

Id. at 435.
Id. at 436.
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on to state his opinion that all practices (and in a footnote he
referred to numerous ones), whereby a public official on a public
payroll performs or conducts a religious exercise in a governmental institution, fall within the same category. While he could
not say that to authorize this prayer was to establish religion in
"the strictly historic meaning" 24 of those words, yet once government finances a religious exercise it inserts a divisive influence
into our communities. The first amendment leaves the government in a position not of hostility to religion but of neutrality.
If government interferes in matters spiritual, it will act as a
divisive force. "The First Amendment teaches that a government
neutral in the field of religion better serves all religious interests. "25
Mr. Justice Stewart dissented. Emphasizing that it could not
be argued that New York had interfered with the free exercise
of anybody's religion, he rejected the idea that letting those who
wanted to say this prayer say it thereby established "an official
religion." On the contrary, he viewed the prayer practice as an
opportunity for children to share in the nation's spiritual heritage.
Unimpressed by the review in the majority's opinion of the
history of an established church in England or in eighteenth
century America, he found much more relevant, as an aid to
interpretation of the first amendment, "the history of the religious
traditions of our people, reflected in countless practices of the institutions and officials of our government." 26 He pointed to the
prayers used in opening the Supreme Court's daily session and the
daily sessions of both houses of Congress, the prayer found in the
third stanza ·of the National Anthem, the motto "In God We
Trust" impressed on our coins, and the inclusion of the phrase
"under God" in the pledge of allegiance to the flag. He stated that
it was all summed up in the Court's opinion in Zorach when it
said, "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being."27 What New York had done, as well as the
Court, the Congress and the President, had been "to recognize
and to follow the deeply entrenched and highly cherished spiritual
traditions of our Nation." 28
24
25
26
21
28

Id. at 442.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 446.
343 U.S. at 313.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 450.
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THE SCOPE OF THE HOLDING

What then is the significance of the Engel case? Viewed with
reference to its facts, the case can be limited to a narrow holding,
namely, that a state may not prescribe the daily recitation by
children under the teacher's supervision of an officially composed
prayer in a public school classroom as part of the school's regular
program. All of these elements become significant. Not only was
the state sanctioning a particular prayer but was using the public
school system's machinery to make it an official prayer, and by
requiring it as a part of the regular school program conducted by
the teacher-the symbol of classroom authority-it was encouraging children to participate. Indeed, in view of all the circumstances, and with due recognition of the psychology of the classroom, objecting children, though free not to participate, were
subject to a subtle pressure to conform.
The Engel decision reaches only the official prescription of an
officially approved prayer for daily recitation in a public school
classroom. Of course, it does not outlaw prayer in the public
schools. Pupils and teachers are free to engage in silent prayer,
and it is consistent with the decision to permit a period for silent
prayer. Moreover, it is important to note that the case deals with
an officially approved prayer which the teacher is required by
order of the school board to conduct. The case does not deal with
the situation where those in charge of the classroom have a discretionary authority to permit opportunity for children voluntarily to express their individual prayers. Nor does the case deal
with the question whether ministers may offer prayers in connection with public school programs. In neither of these situations
are public officers or employees charged with a duty of conducting
in a public school a religious program centered on a state-approved prayer. It was the degree of the state's involvement in this
particular prayer, infusing it with the force and compulsive
character of state-sanctioned action, which peculiarly identifies
the problem of the Engel case and also suggest the limits on the
holding.
Even less does the holding in Engel suggest that the public
schools must display a studied indifference to religion or exclude
from their programs a consideration and appreciation of religion
in the nation's life or deny opportunity for children, individually
or collectively, to engage in exercises that reflect belief in God or
acknowledge the nation's dependence upon Him. The following
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passage taken from a footnote to the majority opinion is of special
interest in this connection:
"There is of course nothing in the decision reached here
that is inconsistent with the fact that school children and
others are officially encouraged to express love for our country by reciting historical documents such as the Declaration
of Independence which contain references to the Deity or
by singing officially espoused anthems which include the
composer's professions of faith in a Supreme Being, or with
the fact that there are many manifestations in our public life
of belief in God. " 29
This important statement is a concession by the Court which
in a very significant way limits the holding and rationale of the
case. Even though the Court goes on to say that "such patriotic
or ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the unquestioned religious exercise that the State of New York has sponsored
in this instance," the fact remains that whether children sing or
recite a prayer and whether the prayer is identified with expressions of patriotic sentiment or not, the school program is being
used to encourage an expression of religious faith in accordance
with the dominant national and community ethos. The distinction is made by the Court that such patriotic exercises are not
distinctively religious in character. How solid a basis this is for
distinction is questionable. The non-sectarian prayer in its invocation of God's blessing upon "our country" also fosters love
of country. Moreover, since the prayer followed the pledge of
allegiance to the flag, it could be viewed as part of a total program in which patriotic and religious sentiments were commingled. The Court in the footnote passage referred to did not
expressly mention the pledge of allegiance, which now contains
the phrase "under God." But if the national anthem, including
its third stanza which is distinctively a prayer, can appropriately
be sung in the public schools, it should follow also that recitation of the pledge of allegiance is permitted.
Whether a distinction drawn in legal terms between school
exercises which are primarily religious in character, even though
they include an underlying patriotic sentiment and can be said
to be directed to patriotic ends, and those which are primarily
patriotic in character and yet are also infused with a religious
29

Id. at 435 n.21.
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sentiment and consciousness, is a substantial and tenable one
is open to question. At most it is a distinction of degree, and
under such a test some form of prayer would be permissible. It
seems to the ·writer ·that the element which adds substance to the
distinction drawn by the Court is that the religious beliefs and
sentiments expressed in national historical documents and utterances and in the National Anthem have been an established part
of the national tradition as compared with a prayer specially composed by state authorities for official use and lacking the sanction
established by common and nationwide historical usage. This at
once raises the question whether the fact that the non-sectarian
prayer was an officially composed as well as an officially approved
prayer was an important element in the decision. The language
in the body of the opinion as well as the distinction made in the
footnote discussed above suggest that this was a critical factor.
But should it be? On the surface it should be immaterial whether
public school authorities themselves compose a prayer prescribed
for recitation in public schools or adopt for official use a prayer
composed by some other person or persons or regularly used by
one or more religious bodies. In either case the government is putting its stamp of approval upon a particular prayer. But if, as
suggested above, a distinction can be made between the historic
expressions of religious faith that have evolved out of the national
life and have become a part of the common national heritage and
those not similarly sanctioned by history, the fact that a prayer
actually originates with public officials does assume special significance. This question assumes a critical importance in cases
which are presently before the Court and which raise the issue
whether recitation of the Lord's Prayer in the public schools
comes under the ban of the Engel decision. 30 Here is a prayer
sanctioned by historical usage and one reflecting the common
religious heritage of a majority of Americans. It cannot be attributed to the government. On its face the Lord's Prayer is nonsectarian but it is subject to special attack on the ground that it
is distinctively the prayer of Christians and that hence the state in
presenting or authorizing its use is preferring one religion over
another. In this situation it appears likely that the Court, faced
with the choice of either approving the recitation of the Lord's
Prayer on the ground that it is not officially composed but has its
so Schempp v. School Dist., 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa.), prob. juris. noted, 371 U.S.
807 (1962); Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698, cert. granted, 371 U.S. 809
(1962).
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own special sanction in history or holding it invalid as sectarian
and preferential in character, will follow the latter course. If
this proves to be the case, the element of official composition loses
its significance, and officially recognized prayers and acknowledgments of Deity may be prescribed for daily ritualistic use in public schools only if incorporated in an exercise of recitation or song
which in its totality is characterized as patriotic in character.
The cases31 before the Court this term also involve state laws
which require or authorize the reading without comment of a
chapter of the Bible or a certain number of biblical verses at the
beginning of the school day. Here the considerations are somewhat different. Students are not asked to recite something as an
expression of their own religious belief. The religious and moral
ideas of the Bible carry their own spiritual authority, unlike religious ideas stamped as authoritative because they are composed
and approved by public officials. In relation to religion, morality
and culture, the Bible as a book assumes a prominent place in the
world's literature. No one can seriously argue that exposure to
or study of the Bible is out of place in the public schools. But
the Bible can also be characterized as a sectarian book. For Christians, the Bible is the book of historic revelation on which their
faith is founded. The Jewish religious community looks to the
Old Testament for its sacred scripture. Any use of the New Testament in the public schools to promote the Christian faith is offensive to persons of the Jewish faith. And in turn Catholics
object to the use of biblical translations which they regard as distinctively Protestant in character. Objections may be made by
other persons of varying beliefs to any use of the Bible which
carries the connotation that it is officially regarded and accepted
as revelation of divine truth. Despite these considerations, it
should be permissible to read and study the Bible in the public
schools both because of its historical and literary features and because it is a source of religious and moral ideas that have influenced our culture and civilization. But to use it in the public
schools as a means of religious indoctrination or for the cultivation of religious faith is objectionable. The difficulty with a prescribed daily reading of the Bible without comment is that, rather
than a meaningful program of study, it becomes more like a religiously ritualistic exercise, premised on the assumption that the
Bible's teachings are inspired and authoritative, and subject to
31

Cases cited in note 30 supra.
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the charge that the state is thereby giving a preference to the
religious groups that regard the Bible as their sacred scripture.
But to state these considerations is to recognize that Bible reading
in the public schools does raise considerations not present in the
prayer case. State courts have disagreed on whether Bible reading
is a forbidden form of sectarian instruction.32 In the light of the
long history of this practice, its widespread prevalence at present,
its sanctioning by a number of state courts, and doubts that the
Court may entertain as to whether Bible reading is as distinctively
a religious exercise as the recitation of a prayer and whether such
reading serves a valid educational purpose, the way is open to the
Supreme Court, if it so chooses, to hold that Engel does not require the invalidation of Bible-reading practices.
With respect to other aspects of the general problem respecting religion and the public schools, the Engel decision makes no
directly relevant contribution. The majority opinion does not
cite the released-time cases, and the case has no immediate bearing upon the continued validity of the distinction drawn by the
Court between released time on the school premises33 and released
time off the school premises.34 While the Engel opinion is premised on the ground that the school program cannot be used to
promote religious exercises and religious indoctrination, thereby
suggesting that all forms of released time are invalid, a distinction
can clearly be observed between the state's promotion of religious
faith by means of an officially adopted prayer prescribed for daily
recitation under the supervision of a publicly paid teacher, and
the state's willingness to excuse children for one hour of the week
from the public school's regular program in order to permit opportunity for religious instruction at the hands of teachers furnished
by the churches. What the state can do to sanction a statesponsored religious exercise as part of a public school's daily program and what it can do to accommodate its public school program to a felt need for religious instruction furnished by the
churches, thereby acting to implement religious freedom, are two
different questions. In both situations it may be claimed that the
state is establishing religion, but in the released-time situation
32 The majority of state courts that have dealt with the problem have upheld Biblereading practices. For a review of the cases, see Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, 691-94,
191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 488-90 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Harrison, The Bible, the Constitution and
Public Education, 29 TENN. L. REv. 360 (1962).
33 McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
34 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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there is a stronger basis for asserting that the establishment limitation should yield to the competing free exercise principle. Even
Mr. Justice Douglas, in his far-reaching and, for the most part,
gratuitous opinion, in which he stressed that public funds or
property cannot be used to finance religious exercises conducted
by public officials, gave no indication that he now regards the
Zorach decision as an incorrect one.35
Finally, in appraising the reach of Engel, it is clear that it has
little if any relevancy in respect to prayers or acknowledgment
of Deity in phases of public life apart from the public school
situation. Thanksgiving proclamations and declaration of a day
of prayer by the President, prayers by ministers on public occasions, the use of chaplains to open sessions of Congress, the inscription of "In God We Trust" on our coins-all involving a
recognition of the place of prayer and of the religious consciousness in our national life-are distinguishable. In none of these
cases is government prescribing an official form of prayer or an
official expression of religious belief for the public's own use.
Moreover, the situation is totally unlike that of the problem
presented in the classroom, where immature and impressionable
children are susceptible to a pressure to conform and to participate in the expression of religious beliefs that carry the sanction
and compulsion of the state's authority.
The conclusion that Engel does not admit of the wide interpretation given to it, particularly in the immediate response to
the decision, is supported by the unusual extra-judicial statement
by Mr. Justice Clark who, in the course of a public address and
with reference to the criticism directed at the school prayer
decision, said that it was a misinterpretation of the decision to say
that it barred all religious observances in the public schools or
other public places. Nor, according to him, did the Court hold
that "there could be no official recognition of a Divine Being ...
or public acknowledgment that we are a religious nation." All
the Court did, Mr. Justice Clark continued, was to rule unconstitutional "a state-written prayer circulated to state-employed
teachers with instructions to have their pupils recite it in unison
at the beginning of each school day." 36
cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 563-64 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
For excerpts of Mr. Justice Clark's address made at the Commonwealth Club in
San Francisco, Aug. 3, 1962, see N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1962, p. 9, col. I.
35 But

86
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CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

The attempt has been made up to this point to examine the
reach of the Engel decision. We turn now to an analysis of the
Engel holding and opinion in terms of basic constitutional theory
respecting the first and fourteenth amendments on which the
Court relied.

A. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
The Court found that the state action involved in the Engel
situation violated the first amendment as made applicable to the
states by the fourteenth amendment. More particularly, the
prayer practice prescribed under authority of New York law
violated the provision of the first amendment prohibiting laws
respecting an establishment of religion. It is important to note
that the Court expressly stated that it was not resting its case on
the free exercise clause of the first amendment, although it did
observe that it was plain that objecting children were placed
under implied pressure to conform by participating in the prayer.
The Court interpreted the establishment clause as stating an
independent limitation which may overlap the free exercise
clause in part but which also reaches wider objectives. The officially prescribed New York prayer was held invalid because it
established the religious beliefs expressed in the prayer and
thereby became a law respecting an establishment of religion.
In commenting on these propositions, it should be pointed out,
first of all, that the majority opinion did not cite a single case
in support of the conclusions reached by it. Indeed, the decision
is unique in its failure to cite, much less discuss, earlier opinions
dealing with the interpretation of the establishment limitation.
This is all the more remarkable since the Court in the celebrated
Everson opinion37 had laid down broad statements on the meaning of this limitation, and in its McCollum decision38 had invalidated a program of released time on public school premises
on the ground that this constituted a use of the publicly owned
and operated school system to enlist students for religious instruction in violation of the ideas first advanced in Everson. In
the well-known dicta of his Everson opinion, Mr. Justice Black
had stated that the effect of the first amendment's twin phrasing
was to establish a principle of separation of church and state, and
37 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
as McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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he had referred to Jefferson's letter in which he characterized the
Constitution as establishing a wall of separation between church
and state. He had further stated that the effect of the first amendment's establishment clause was not only to forbid an established
church or to forbid giving a preference to one or more religions,
but that it went farther and forbade aid to all religions, whether
preferential or not, and that tax monies could not be spent to support any religious activities or institutions. Thus, the Everson
opinion had read into the first amendment a theory of strict separation of church and state going far beyond the notion of an
established church in the historic sense of the word.
The simplest explanation of the Court's failure to cite any
precedent is that the earlier cases, dealing with use of public
funds to provide for the transportation of children to parochial
schools, with programs of released time for religious instruction
furnished by the churches-whether on or off the school premises
-and with Sunday closing laws, were not directly in point. The
closest analogy was furnished by the McCollum decision, where
the Court had invalidated a program of released time for religious instruction conducted on the school's premises by teachers
who were furnished by the churches. This case supported the
broad proposition that no part of the public school program
could be used in the furtherance of religious instruction or exercises on the school premises. But McCollum involved a close
working relation between the schools and the churches and a
substantial use of public school property for religious instruction.
Neither factor was present in Engel. Apart, however, from reliance
on the precedent furnished by the McCollum decision, Mr. Justice
Black could have found much in the language he used in his
prior opinions for the Court in Everson and McCollum to support
the ideas relied upon in Engel. He had stated in Everson that
government cannot pass laws "which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." 39 In the McCollum
opinion he had cited this language with approval. The prescribed
non-sectarian prayer could easily be characterized either as an aid
to all religions or as a preference for the particular religious beliefs
embodied in this prayer. Why Mr. Justice Black chose to disregard
his opinions in Everson and McCollum is a matter for speculation.
In view of the statement by Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring
opinion, that he now regards the actual decision in Everson as
39

330 U.S. at 15.
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incorrect,4° it may be that Mr. Justice Black's failure to cite
Everson assumes substantial significance. His failure to cite McCollum is perhaps more readily explained, since any reference to
McCollum would have been incomplete without citing Zorach
as well. Not only did Zorach limit McCollum by holding that a
program of released time for religious instruction was valid if conducted off the school premises, but Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion
had indicated a substantial retreat in the interpretation of the establishment clause from that enunciated in the Everson opinion.
He had stated there that the first amendment did not establish an
over-all principle of separation of church and state, that the state
could take account of the religious interests of its people and that
it could accommodate its public school program to these interests.
The Zorach opinion thus undermined the absolutism expressed
in Everson and McCollum and appeared to recognize that the
establishment limitation must at times be balanced against the
free exercise principle and that the legislature may in appropriate
instances, in the interest of neutrality, choose to advance the free
exercise of religion at some expense to the establishment prohibition. It is for these reasons that Zorach was generally regarded as
substantially limiting, if not undermining, much of what was said
in Everson and McCollum 41-a view that seemed to be shared by
the four Justices, including Mr. Justice Black, who dissented so
vigorously in Zorach. It is understandable, therefore, that Mr.
Justice Black in writing the opinion in Engel wished to avoid any
discussion of precedents that might involve his approval of Zorach
and the views stated there. Finally, it is open to speculation also
that differences within the Court in interpreting and reconciling
the prior cases and the supporting opinions made it prudent for
Mr. Justice Black, in writing an opinion that would command the
support of at least four other Justices, to avoid all discussion of
prior cases. But Mr. Justice Black's opinion, although it does not
rely on prior cases, does appear to restore the broad and absolutist
interpretation ~f the establishment clause first stated in the Everson opinion.42
40

370 U.S. at 443.

41 See Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, 686-89, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 483-86 (Sup. Ct.

1959); KAUPER, CML LIBERTIES AND THE CONsrITUTION 17-19 (1962) [also located in
Kauper, Church and State: Cooperative Separatism, 60 MICH. L. REv. l, 10-13 (1961)].
42 Mr. Justice Douglas' views may have a vital impact on the course of the Court's
future decisions in this area. Opinions expressed by him in dissent in the Sunday
closing law cases [See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 563-64 (1961).], together with his emphasis in his separate opinion in Engel on the idea that no public
funds or properties can be used to finance religious exercises and his express questioning
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Whether the Everson opinion, postulating a broad no-aid-toreligion idea, correctly stated the meaning of this clause is open
to serious question. 43 As Mr. Justice Douglas frankly recognized
in his concurring opinion in Engel, the prescription of a school
prayer for voluntary participation by students is not an establishment of religion within the historic meaning of this language. In
Everson, Mr. Justice Black relied in large part on the views of
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson in giving the establishment
language its broad construction. 44 Madison and Jefferson viewed
this language as furnishing protection for freedom of conscience
and protection against ecclesiastical domination of political affairs by imposing a barrier to any kind of governmental sanction
or support of religious activities. In their view the establishment
language served as a counterweight to the free exercise clause. But
there is no evidence that the committee that approved the text
of the first amendment and the Congress that submitted the
amendment and the state legislatures that approved it supposed
that the establishment language carried the wide connotations
attributed to it by Madison. 45 There is, however, some evidence
to support the conclusion that those responsible for the final wording used in the :first amendment-and this included persons besides Madison46-did have in mind something more than an officially established church and something more than giving a
of the result reached in Everson, raise the question whether Mr. Justice Douglas still
adheres to the ideas he expressed in Zorach. On the other hand, his failure in his
separate opinion in Engel to repudiate the result in Zorach, all the more conspicuous
because of doubts he expressed as to the holding in Everson, may indicate that he
continues to draw the line between use of public funds, property and personnel in aid
of religious instruction and exercises and "accommodation" of the public school pro•
gram to religious instruction given under church auspices off the school premises.
For discussion of the Engel opinion with reference to McCollum and Zorach, see
Kurland, supra note 2, at 25-29; Sutherland, supra note 4, at 30-35.
43 For varying interpretations of the intended meaning of the establishment language,
see PARSONS, THE Fmsr FREEDOM (1948); l STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 538-61 (1950); Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REv.
426 (1953); Pfeffer, Church and State: Something Less Than Separation, 19 U. Cm. L.
REv. (1951).

44 For Madison's view and for a discussion of his part in the drafting of the text
of the first amendment, see BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 17871800, at 264-75 (1950). See also Brant, Madison and the Prayer Case, The New Republic,
July 30, 1962, p. 18.
45 For a detailed examination of the proceedings of the congressional committee that
drafted the religion clauses of the first amendment, see l STOKES, op. cit. supra note 43.
See also Smylie, supra note 4.
46 l STOKES, op. cit. supra note 43, at 543-48, attributes chief credit to Samuel Livermore for the wording and questions the widely held idea that Madison composed the
final draft. He states also that Madison's great emphasis was on securing a "legal
equality" among sects. Id. at 548.
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preference to one or more religions. Fragmentary evidence supports the idea that this language was intended to keep Congress
"from establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship." 47 It
does not appear to be a distortion of words to say that prescription of an official prayer for recitation in public schools is the
establishment of an official mode of worship and is, therefore,
forbidden. But, as a practical matter, even this interpretation in
its application to prayer in schools is open to question when consideration is given to the practical construction afforded by the
whole course of American history. Here the opinion of the New
York trial court is particularly illuminating in showing that public recognition of prayer and of Deity reflected the "sense of the
nation" at the time of the adoption of the first and fourteenth
amendments and should be taken into account in the process of
constitutional interpretation. It is indeed remarkable that Mr.
Justice Black in his opinion in Engel completely disregarded the
long history with respect to prayers in public life and in schools.
Mr. Justice Black did refer to history-the control of the
Book of Common Prayer by Parliament and the evils resulting
from it and the concern that eventually developed in this country
that there should be no union of church and state, since such a
union tended to degrade religion and to subject the state to risk
of ecclesiastical domination. But, as Mr. Justice Stewart pointed
out in his dissenting opinion, it is a far cry from control of prayer
in an officially established church to a public school program that
gives opportunity for voluntary participation in common prayer.48
Insofar as the Court relied on history in Engel, it followed a highly
selective process in determining what history was relevant. The
Court's selection of history in determining what it will read into
the establishment clause is in itself a highly subjective process.
But in this respect Engel again demonstrates that the Constitution is what the judges say it is.
It seems clear that, if the no-aid-to-religion principle is a valid
interpretation of the establishment language, the Court reached
a correct result in the Engel case. In Everson49 the Court upheld
the expenditure of public funds to reimburse parents for the cost
of transporting children to parochial schools. The Court recog•17 1 STOKES, op. cit. supra note 43, at 546; Katz, supra note 43, at 434. See also
Smylie, supra note 4.
48 For a brief discussion of the historical arguments and their relevancy, see Kurland, mpra note 2, at 22-25.
40 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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nized that this resulted in aid to parochial school education but
said that this result was incidental to the valid secular purpose of
promoting the safe transportation of children to school. In the
Sunday closing law cases50 the Court held that the validity of
Sunday laws as proper exercises of the police power to promote
the general welfare was not impaired by the fact that they had the
incidental effect of favoring the Christian day of worship. Thus,
the Court, in the cases where it has purported to follow an absolutist interpretation of the establishment language, has, nevertheless, permitted aid to religion as an incident to a lawful secular
purpose. But in the Engel case the prayer practice was seen to be
directed to wholly religious ends and the aid to religion was
primary and not incidental. The opposing argument that the
prayer exercise was intended to serve a patriotic purpose by creating an awareness and appreciation of prayer as part of the American heritage proved too much and if accepted would have undermined the whole no-aid idea. Nevertheless, the Court itself came
perilously close to this idea and created difficulties for itself when
it recognized that school children may properly be encouraged
to recite patriotic passages containing references to Deity and to
sing the National Anthem which in its third verse incorporates
a prayer that expresses some of the same sentiments found in the
New York Regents' prayer. As pointed out earlier, this is justified
on the ground that such activities are not distinctively religious
exercises. To put the matter in another way, schools may engage
in religious exercises if they are incident to patriotic purposes.
All of this suggests that the no-aid principle is not so absolute
as it sounds and is not a very viable principle for solving problems
with respect to the interrelationship of government and religion.
Moreover, the whole course of American governmental practices,
not only in giving recognition to the nation's religious heritage
and consciousness but also in sanctioning various forms of direct
and indirect assistance for religious activities, is a repudiation
of the extreme Madisonian view and lends no support to the kind
of absolutism that appears on the surface in the Engel opinion. 111
Reference may be made at this point to alternative theories
50 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown,
Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher
v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
51 See examples cited in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437 n.l (1962) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); FELLMAN, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM 40-41 (1959); KAUPER, CIVIL LmERTIES AND
THE CoNsrITUTION 35-39 (1962) [also located in Kauper, Church and State: Cooperative
Separatism, 60 MICH. L. REv. I, 26-29 (1961)].
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on the construction of the free exercise and establishment clauses
of the first amendment. Mr. Justice Douglas in speaking for the
majority in Zorach 52 stated that government must be neutral between sects, and in his concurring opinion in Engel53 stated that
government must be neutral in the field of religion. Professor
Katz has advanced the idea that the primary thrust of the first
amendment's religious clauses is to protect religious liberty, that
this objective is best attained when government remains neutral
in respect to religious matters, but that government must abandon
neutrality in some situations where adherence to the establishment
limitation would result in an interference with the free exercise
of religion. 54 Professor Kurland proposes the thesis that the first
amendment requires the government to be neutral in the sense
that it can do nothing to hinder or promote religion as such,
that is, religion or religious activities cannot be the basis for
classification. 55 The difference between the Douglas and Katz
view, on the one hand, and the Kurland view, on the other, is
that the former is addressed to the problem of neutrality within
the framework of a first amendment view that recognizes the free
exercise and establishment principles as independent, sometimes
overlapping, and sometimes competing principles, whereas the
Kurland thesis accepts these principles as mutually exclusive of
each other. It is fair to say that the Supreme Court's opinions on
the whole reflect the view that the two religion clauses of the
first amendment state independent limitations, and that the problem of neutrality may be approached on this basis.
It is clear that government must be neutral as between competing religious claims. It may not prefer one religion over another. But to say that government must be neutral as between
religion and non-religion raises more questions. If this means that
government can do nothing which in fact aids religion, this may
in some situations mean that government must discriminate
against religion and thereby violate the free exercise clause. The
Constitution does not require this. On the contrary, any meaningful concept of neutrality must permit government some disat !114.
53 !170 U.S. at 44!1.
M Katz, supra note 4!1, at 428.
55 KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw 17-18, 111-12 (1962). The Engel decision is
clearly in accord with Professor Kurland's thesis since, by prescribing a religious exercise, the state was acting on the basis of a classification that promoted religious activity
as such. For his analysis and comments on Engel, see Kurland, The Regents' Prayer
Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying . • .", 1962 SUPREME COURT REv. I.
52 !14!1 U.S.
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cretion in striking a balance between the establishment and the
free exercise principles since they may conflict. If neutrality
means that government must be indifferent to religion, and must
base its policies, actions and programs on the theory that religion is irrelevant to life, it means that government is committed
to a philosophy of secularism, and then the question must be
raised whether secularism as an officially established orthodoxy
is any more consistent with the first amendment than a religious
orthodoxy. 56 But such a conception of neutrality is inconsistent
with the unbroken tradition of American life in giving expression
to the religious habits and consciousness of the American people,
a tradition supporting the Court's assertion in Zorach that "we
are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being." 57 Indeed, if the public schools disregard the religious
factors in the educational process, they are not neutral. Neutrality
is a two-edged sword and its application in a given situation invites
study of a variety of considerations.
The decision in Engel may be measured by the standard of
neutrality. Clearly the state's action in sanctioning a particular
prayer was an expression of governmental preference for the religious beliefs embodied in that prayer, and to this extent it discriminated against persons who did not accept these principles or
who preferred to pray in another way. The state, then, was not
being neutral in the narrower sense of the term. But did the
Court in denying the state the power to prescribe an official
prayer for recitation in public schools thereby compel the state
to discriminate on the basis of religion or to interfere with religious freedom? Although the argument was made before the
Court that the prayer exercise implemented the religious freedom
of children who wanted to participate, the proposition that the
right to recite prayers in public schools is essential to religious
freedom is hardly convincing. The general right of prayer is not
affected by the decision and, as previously noted, some form of
prayer in the classroom is consistent with the Engel decision.
Nor can it be said that a prohibition of officially sanctioned prayer
in public school classrooms violates neutrality by forcing the state
56 See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961), to the effect that nontheistic religions such as Ethical Culture and Secular Humanism come within the scope
of the free exercise clause. See also the statement in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), that government may not prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion. Id. at 642. See
also Ball, supra note 6.
57 343 U.S. at 313.
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to use its schools to promote secularism as the officially established
orthodoxy. Consistent with the decision the schools and government may still follow practices and educational programs that
reflect a sympathetic awareness of religion and its relevancy to
the life of the individual and the community. The state, then, was
supporting a practice which sanctioned and gave a preferred position to the expression of religious ideas even though it was not
constitutionally required to do so in the interests of either religious freedom or strict neutrality. This leaves the basic question
of whether the Constitution does require a strict or absolute neutrality in regard to religious matters, or whether, in at least a
limited way, government may in its institutional life and programs express a preference for the expression of religious ideas
that are in accord with the national tradition and reflect the
beliefs shared by a preponderant element of the community.
Numerous governmental practices at all levels make clear
that government has never been absolutely neutral in religious
matters. Moreover, the Court's opinion in Engel in sanctioning
public school exercises which are viewed as primarily patriotic
in character but also have religious significance seems to make
clear that the public schools are not required in the interest of
a strict neutrality to abandon exercises that invite student participation in expressions of religious faith. 58 What seems to be
really important is not that government be strictly or abstractly
neutral but that government in its policies and programs does
not trespass in any significant way upon the rights of minorities.
To criticize Engel on the ground that it permits a minority to
exercise a commanding influence in determining public school
policy is in itself a pointless argument since a major purpose of
a constitutional system is to place a check on the will of the
majority in the interest of protecting minority rights. There can
be no quarrel with the Court's overruling the majority will in
Engel if it may be assumed that minority rights were involved.
liB For examples of governmental practices that reflect the nation's religious tradition and for criticism of the distinction made in the majority opinion between "patriotic
or ceremonial occasions" and "an unquestioned religious exercise,'' see Mr. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Engel, 370 U.S. at 446-50. See also the discussion in the text
supra at 1040, 1042, 1046.
Reference may be also made at this point to the decision in Zorach sustaining the
validity of a released-time program for religious instruction conducted off the school
premises as supporting the proposition that the state may accommodate its official program to the recognition and furtherance of the religious interests of its citizens even
though it is not constitutionally required to do so. Mr. Justice Douglas, who wrote
the opinion in Zorach, had no difficulty in reconciling the released-time program with
his concept of neutrality.
·
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B. Personal Rights and the Standing Question
This leads to a consideration of a major difficulty raised by
Engel. The Court did not rest its decision on the ground that
the prayer practice subjected objecting children to an implied
pressure to participate and thereby offended freedom of religion or
a personal freedom of conscience. Instead, the Court made it clear
that it was resting its case on the establishment clause, and that
this clause, while designed in part to protect individual freedom,
was also designed to prevent a union of government and religion.
But insofar as the establishment clause is invocable by individuals,
must it not be shown that a practice alleged to constitute an establishment of religion infringes on constitutionally recognized freedoms or interests? At this point it is useful to inquire whether the
prohibition of laws respecting an establishment of religion can be
translated into a protection of some kind of fundamental freedom.
For Madison and Jefferson it assumed significance as a protection
for freedom of belief and conscience which transcends the more
limited concept of freedom of religion. This view finds support
in the following statement taken from Mr. Justice Roberts'
opinion for the Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut:
"The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject
of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law.
On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the
chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two
concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act." 59
Mr. Justice Roberts went to the heart of the matter when he interpreted the establishment clause to protect freedom of belief by
forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship.60 This freedom is violated when
59 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). See also Madison's statement, when the first amendment
was pending in Congress in substantially its final form, that "he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the
legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience." I .ANNALS oF CONG. 730 (1834) [1789-1791]. This statement
is quoted by Mr. Justice Reed in his dissenting opinion in McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 244 (1948).
60 See, however, Professor Howe's criticism of Mr. Justice Roberts' interpretation
on the ground that the establishment language, as stating a federal principle, namely,
that Congress has no authority to deal with matters relating to religious establishment,
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a person is forced to profess a belief whether or not contrary to
conviction, is denied a right or privilege because of refusal to
profess an officially sanctioned belief, or is forced to pay taxes
in support of a church or religious practices. Unless the New York
prayer practice, though voluntary in form, had the effect of indirectly coercing objectors who did not care to participate, it is
difficult to see what rights were violated. It can hardly be claimed
that taxpayers were subjected to any additional burden because
of the use of school facilities or personnel in connection with the
prayer exercise. 61
Moreover, apart from the question of whether an individual
in order to claim the protection of the establishment clause must
show that his freedom of conscience is violated, the requirement
of proper standing as a party in interest to raise constitutional
questions must still be considered. What standing did the petitioners have in this case? They brought this suit as parents and
the theory of the trial court, relying on the Zorach decision, was
that the petitioners were asserting their right to control the education of their children and the right to be free from a religious
practice in the public schools which was contrary to their own
beliefs or unbeliefs and those of their children. 62 The Supreme
Court did not even discuss the question of standing. It seems
proper to infer then that the standing requisite to maintain the
suit in the state court carried forward as a basis for standing before the Supreme Court. Since the Supreme Court has not disavowed the party in interest requirement, since it accepted a standing premised originally on a claim of violation of the petitioners'
rights, and since it stated that it had agreed to review the case
because it involved "rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendll?-ents," 63 it appears to be implicit in the decision that some
substantial legal interests of the petitioners were at stake in the
case. Admittedly, however, the Court's express statement that it
was not basing its holding on the ground that the prayer exercise
goes beyond the purpose of protecting individual rights. Howe, The Constitutional
Question, in RELIGION AND THE FREE SOCIETY 49, 52-53 (The Fund for the Republic
pamphlet, 1958). See also notes 64 and 75 infra.
61 Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion was squarely based on the theory that
tax funds and property were used to support a religious exercise, but this emphasis
does not appear in the majority opinion. See Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S.
429 (1952), holding that taxpayers did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of Bible reading in a public school, absent a showing that this practice resulted
in added out-of-pocket costs to the operation of the school system.
62 Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, 666-67, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 464-65 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
63 370 U.S. at 424.
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was a violation of religious freedom and its failure to discuss the
standing question emerge as puzzling aspects of the decision. 64
Whatever questions are raised respecting the rights and the
standing of the petitioners under the first amendment become
even more acute when the restrictions of this amendment are
translated into fourteenth amendment limitations. There is a
danger of forgetting that the first amendment was not directly
involved in the Engel case, since by its terms it is a limitation only
on Congress. It becomes involved only on the theory that the fourteenth amendment operates in some way to make the first amendment applicable as a limitation on the states. On this question
Mr. Justice Black's opinion is extraordinarily interesting. All
that he found it necessary to say is that the first amendment's
provisions "are operative against the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment." 65 What language of the fourteenth amendment has this effect? On this point, Mr. Justice Black's opinion
is eloquently and discreetly silent. But the fourteenth amendment
is not an abstraction or some mysterious event in history achieving constitutional change without resort to words. Is it not pertinent to ask what language of the fourteenth amendment has the
effect of making the first amendment applicable?
Any thorough exploration of the questions with respect to
the interrelationship of the first and fourteenth amendments
would unduly extend the scope of this article. But some basic
theories of interpretation should be stated. Three lines of thought
may be identified:
(1) The main line of interpretation of the fourteenth amendment, as a basis for protecting substantive and procedural rights
against state impairment, has turned on the clause of its first section which states, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law." The classic
theory expressed in the judicial gloss on this language is that the
64 Although the opinion in Engel does not expressly deal with the question of
whether the establishment clause protects a broad freedom of conscience, as distinguished from a narro~ver freedom of reli!?on _protected by the free e.'Cercise clause, it does
on its face accord with Professor Howes view [note 60 supra] that the establishment
clause as a limitation on Congress goes beyond the purpose of protecting individual
rights. In tum, the Court's failure to discuss the standing question may then be
interpreted as suggesting a substantial modification,_ if not virtual abandonment, of the
traditional party-in-interest concept so far as standmg to raise the establishment question is concerned. For analysis and discussion of Engel with respect to the standing
problem, see Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARV. L. REv. 25 (1962).
See also Kurland, supra note 55.
65 370 U.S. at 430.
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"liberty" clause serves to protect those freedoms which are ranked
as fundamental and that there is no necessary relationship between
these and the Bill of Rights. 66 In the application of this theory
the freedoms of the first amendment came to be recognized as
fundamental. Thus, in the Cantwell decision Mr. Justice Roberts
stated that "the fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the
fourteenth amendment] embraces the liberties guaranteed by the
First Amendment." 67 Whether the language used is that first
amendment freedoms are ranked as fundamental or that they are
absorbed or selectively incorporated into the due process clause,
the result is the same, namely, the first amendment freedoms are
a part of the liberty protected under the due process clause.
(2) A variant of the fundamental rights theory is that when
liberties specified in the Bill of Rights are recognized as fundamental they have the same dimensions and quality, when incorporated into the due process clause, as they have in their original setting in the Bill of Rights and are subject only to the
limitations there recognized. This may be characterized for purpose of convenience as the Brennan theory, since Mr. Justice Brennan has most clearly articulated this idea in recent cases. 68 This
theory of interpretation becomes a means of enlarging the fundamental freedoms as limitations on state action since it by-passes
the usual due process consideration that the fundamental liberties
may be restricted so long as the state is acting reasonably to
achieve legitimate governmental purposes. But this theory is still
centered on the protection of fundamental freedoms.
(3) A third view, the one advanced by Mr. Justice Black and
supported by Mr. Justice Douglas, which may be referred to as
the Black theory, is that the effect of the fourteenth amendment
was to make the entire Bill of Rights apply to the states. 69 Mr.
Justice Black persists in this theory which he bases on an interpretation of historical intent despite its being discredited by legal
historians. 70 The significance of this view is that it subjects the
states to the Bill of Rights, without reference to the fundamental
oo See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937).
01 310 U.S. at 303.
os See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, rehearing denied, 364 U.S. 855
(1960).
oo See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
70 See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124 (1959); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L.
REv. 5 (1949); Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. R.Ev. 533,
547 (1951).
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freedoms concept and without regard to usual due process considerations. 71
The relevancy of these three approaches to the first amendment question is apparent. Under all three views, the first amendment is recognized to have a special significance with respect to
the states. But the "fundamental rights" interpretation and the
Brennan theory place emphasis upon the freedoms of the first
amendment, as part of the liberty protected under the due process
clause, whereas under the Black view all of the first amendment
is applicable to the states and hence it is not necessary to inquire
whether a question of fundamental freedoms is involved. The
practical effect of his theory is that by judicial act the first amendment is amended to read, "Neither Congress nor the States shall
make any law respecting an establishment of religion ...." Thus,
he could rest his opinion in Engel on the establishment clause
without finding that the petitioners' freedoms were violated.
Moreover, since the first amendment's language is absolute, there
is no place in Mr. Justice Black's thinking for an inquiry into
whether the state had acted in an arbitrary or unreasonable way
in impinging upon the petitioners' interests.72
The interpretation of the first amendment's establishment
clause as a limitation on the states without regard to the usual
due process considerations was already foreshadowed in the Everson and McCollum decisions. But Everson turned on the right
of a taxpayer not to have out-of-pocket expenditures of tax funds
made in support of religious activities,73 and McCollum could be
interpreted to turn on the right of a person who was both taxpayer
and parent not to have school property used in a substantial way
for religious instruction and not to have her child's freedom impaired by a public school attendan~e requirement imposed only
on those who did not attend the religious education classes. 74 The
Engel opinion, however, is unique in that it finds a state practice
71 In Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), Mr. Justice Black in his dissenting
opinion indicated that the Bill of Rights is made applicable to the states by means of
the privileges and immunities clause of § 1 of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 71-72.
72 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
73 The preamble to the "Virginia Bill of Religious Liberty," quoted in the Court's
opinion, 330 U.S. at 12-13, contains the following passage: "[T]o compel a man to
furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves,
is sinful and tyrannical."
74 There was, however, no showing in Mccollum that students were in fact coerced
to attend the religious education classes. For a discussion of the Mccollum and Zorach
cases with respect to the standing problem posed by Engel, see Kurland, supra note 55;
Sutherland, supra note 64.
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invalid as an establishment of religion without regard to whether
it offended any rights or interests of the petitioners.
It is not surprising that Mr. Justice Black in his Engel opinion
saw the problem as wholly a first amendment establishment question, unrelated to the due process clause and the deprivation of
liberty, since he has committed himself to this view. What is
surprising is that some other members of the Court who supported
the majority opinion appeared sub silentio to endorse a view of
the first and fourteenth amendment interrelationship which rests
on a spurious interpretation of history, disregards the main line of
fourteenth amendment interpretation, and marks a bold high in
the long history of judicial free-wheeling in the construction of
this amendment. 75
Whatever significance may attach to the surface of the opinion
in Engel, some aspects of the case do suggest that the decision
finds its ultimate justification on the ground that the prayer practice carried a compulsive force notwithstanding its apparent voluntary character, and that it therefore resulted in violation of
freedom of conscience. Why should the Court otherwise have
emphasized all the elements of the exercise that gave it such an
official nature? Indeed, Mr. Justice Black stated that the "indirect
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the
prevailing officially 'approved religion is plain." 76
Regardless of its underlying theory, the Engel decision does
suggest substantial problems with respect to protection of minority rights. How far may the dominant sentiment of the community be given expression in the public schools, or for that
matter in public life generally, where the expression of this sentiment is offensive to minority groups? The answers to these
questions, inherent in our pluralistic society, are not easy. Must
all practices offensive to minority groups be barred, or is it enough
that they be free not to participate? We may put alongside the
problem of Engel the question presented in West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,77 where the Court held that a Jehovah's
Witness could not be denied the privilege of attending a public
75 On the question whether the establishment limitation of the first amendment,
as stating a federal principle in placing a jurisdictional limit on congressional power,
should have any carry-over to the fourteenth amendment except in terms of protection
of fundamental rights, thereby permitting states to take such action "in aid of religion
as does not appreciably affect the religious or other constitutional rights of [others],"
see Howe, supra note 60, at 53-57; Freund, supra note 70, at 533-34. See also note 64 supra.
76 370 U.S. at 431.
77 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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school because of his refusal to stand up and salute the flag at a
school exercise held at the beginning of the day. For the Jehovah's
Witnesses a salute to the flag is an obeisance which is idolatrous
and, therefore, offensive to their religious beliefs. Mr. Justice
Jackson, delivering the opinion of the Court, did not rest the case
on the ground of religious freedom but significantly on the
broader ground of freedom of thought. In the well-known passage from his opinion, he said:
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein." 78

But there was no indication that the school board was under a
duty to eliminate the flag-salute exercise in order to protect the
Jehovah's Witnesses against the embarrassment and pressures arising from their non-participation. It was enough that the J ehovah's Witness could not be compelled to take part. What distinguishes this case from Engel where the Court finds that the prayer
exercise must be discontinued? Superficially, the distinction suggests itself that in the flag-salute case the state is promoting a
proper secular purpose-cultivation of patriotic sentiments. Even
if this distinction is tenable, it does indicate that the extent to
which public schools may engage in practices that are offensive
to conscience is a question of degree. But actually the distinction
is not as convincing as it seems. Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion in
Barnette rested on the ground that the state may not prescribe
any orthodoxy or force citizens to confess their faith therein. In
other words, quite apart from the specific prohibition on the
establishment of religion, the state may not officially establish any
faith-political or religious. At this point it should also be noted
that Mr. Justice Black said in Torcaso v. Watkins 70 that religious
freedom under the Constitution extends to such non-theistic religions as Ethical Culture and Secular Humanism. Putting Barnette and Torcaso together, it may be said, then, that the Constitution forbids the establishment of either theistic or non-theistic
orthodoxies. If this is so, then it may be questioned whether in
the interest of protecting the non-conformist a distinction should
78 Id. at 642. It should be noted, however, that Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy
in their concurring opinions laid stress on the religious freedom argument.
79 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961).
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be observed between the state's promoting a non-theistic political
orthodoxy which offends a minority religious group and its action
in promoting a theistic orthodoxy which offends a minority of
believers and non-believers. If the protection afforded in the name
of religious freedom against a state-prescribed non-theistic orthodoxy is that a person cannot be compelled to participate, whereas
the protection afforded in the name of the establishment clause is
that a person may demand that any exercise promoting theistic
belief be completely eliminated, the result is that the freedom
protected by the establishment clause is regarded as having a
higher value than the freedom protected by the free exercise
clause. Perhaps the simplest explanation of this situation is that
the Jehovah's Witnesses have not demanded that the flag salute
exercise be completely eliminated in order to avoid an implied
coercion on their children to participate, but to point up this
problem is to indicate that the degree of protection accorded nonconformists who object to public practices they find offensive is
a matter requiring further careful probing. 80
To state the problem in this way is to recognize that the first
amendment's explicit clause respecting an establishment of religion, as well as its implied prohibition of the establishment
of any kind of orthodoxy, as recognized in Barnette, cannot be
given an absolute construction but must be balanced against a
variety of competing factors, including considerations of community interest that are legitimated by American life and experience. In construing the freedoms expressly safeguarded by the
first amendment-freedom of religion, freedom of speech and
freedom of press-the Court has recognized that these freedoms,
whether as first amendment freedoms, or as absorbed into the
liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment, are not absolute,
but may be restricted by legislation directed to the protection of
appropriate public interests as defined by the legislature. 81 Why
80 The New York trial court recognized that, even with restrictions on the prayer
practice designed to secure freedom of non-participation, some subtle pressures might
operate on persons not desiring to participate. But on this point Justice Meyer stated
that the disadvantages of non-conformity arc inherent in the American situation, and
that objections to pressure placed on private persons by persons other than the state
cannot be elevated to the level of a constitutional freedom. Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d
659, 695, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 491-92 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
81 See, e.g., Freedom of Religion: Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Freedom of Speech: Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Freedom of the Press:
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 988 (1952). Sec also the majority opinion in Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
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the establishment limitation and the liberties implicit in it should
be elevated to a higher place than these freedoms has not been
made clear. James Madison's "three pence" argument,82 if valid to
support an absolutist interpretation of the establishment principle,
should be equally valid to support the absolutist interpretation
which the Court has rejected in its interpretation of the first
amendment freedoms generally. 83
Is it the effect of the Engel decision to bar the recitation of
prayers by public school children in the situation where no parents voice an objection? Conceivably there are communities in
the United States where all parents are ready and willing to have
their children participate in such a practice. If the Engel case
rests on an abstract and absolute non-establishment limitation,
unrelated to infringement upon personal liberty, all school boards
are in principle bound thereby, even though in the absence of
objecting parents a serious standing problem would be presented
as regards the bringing of a lawsuit to compel the school board
to comply with the law as established by the Engel decision.84 If,
as has been suggested, the Engel case finds its real justification in
the consideration that the officially prescribed prayer subjected all
children to a compulsion to participate and thereby impaired the
liberty of children and their parents, then Engel has no relevancy
where all parents are willing to have their children participate.
In a country as large as the United States, with great variations
in the communities so far as religious elements are concerned,
there is no compelling reason why the Constitution should be
interpreted to require a uniform rule prohibiting all prayer exercises, without regard to the elements of coercion, impairment
of rights of objectors and the effect of the exercises in promoting
community divisiveness.
See text supra at 1039 for the passage from Madison quoted in the Engel opinion.
In an address delivered at the University of Utah, Feb. 27, 1963, in which he
criticized the "absolutist" approach of the majority opinion in the Engel decision, Dean
Erwin N. Griswold of the Harvard Law School said: "If one thinks of the Constitution
as a God-given text stating fixed law for all time, and then focuses on a single passage, or indeed on two words-'no law'-without recognizing all the other words in
the whole document, and its relation to the society outside the document, one can
find the answers very simply..•• The absolutist approach involves, I submit, a failure
to exercise the responsibilities-and indeed the pains-of judgment. By ignoring factors
relevant to sound decisions, it inevitably leads to wrong results." Excerpts from Dean
Griswold's address appeared in the public press. See, e.g., Ann Arbor News, Feb. 28, 1963,
p. 13.
84 In Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952), the Court held that a taxpayer
did not have standing before the Court to contest the validity of a Bible-reading practice,
in the absence of a showing that the practice resulted in added out-of-pocket costs to
the operation of the school system. See Sutherland, supra note 64, at 32•35, 39-42.
82
83
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CONCLUSIONS

Viewed with respect to the precise problem before the Court,
the decision in Engel is not a disturbing one, when evaluated in
terms of underlying policy considerations. Prayer, religious faith,
and the freedom of religion are not damaged by the Court's holding. On the contrary, the decision maintains the dignity and religious significance of prayer by keeping it free from state compulsion and interference, and, by the same token, it preserves the
freedom of both the believer and the non-believer in respect to
prayer. Nor should it be of consequence that the prayer was "nonsectarian." Even such a prayer can be productive of religious divisiveness, not only because it is objectionable to non-believers or
non-theistic religionists, but also because theistic believers may
find it an offense to conscience to engage in prayer except in accordance with the tenets of their own religion. Moreover, religionists can have little enthusiasm for an officially sanctioned
non-sectarian expression of religious belief which at most reflects
a vague and generalized religiosity. Any usefulness of a prayer
practice in public schools as symbolic of the religious tradition
in our national life, of the values of religion to our society, and
of religious ideas shared in common, must be weighed against the
peril that the official promotion of common-denominator religious
practices, conspicuous by their vagueness and syncretistic character, will contribute to the furtherance and establishment of an
official folk or culture religion which many competent observers
regard as a serious threat to the vitality and distinctive witness
of the historic faiths. 85
The decision makes sense in terms of constitutional considerations if the case is confined to the fact emphasized by the
Court and if the constitutional rights of objecting parents and
children are viewed as vital to the result. It is, however, the
Court's broad and absolutist interpretation of the first amendment, its disregard of the sanctions furnished by history for religious practices in the public schools, its indifference to the problem of standing, its failure to relate the establishment limitation
to meaningful considerations of personal liberty-a failure all the
more conspicuous when the relevancy of the fourteenth amendment is taken into account-and its failure to come to grips with
the delicate problem of the rights of non-conformists in a com85 See HERBERG, PROTESTANT, CATHOLIC, JEW 254-72
MARTY, THE NEW SHAPE OF AMERICAN RELIGION 31-89

(Doubleday paperback ed. 1960);
(1959).
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munity that recognizes a common religious heritage that present
the constitutional problems and difficulties. A decision resting on
the narrower ground of freedom of religion or of conscience, explaining why the considerations advanced in support of the prayer
practice were outweighed by the rights of the objectors, and why
under the circumstances the feature of voluntary participation did
not sufficiently protect the interests of objectors, would have been
much more satisfactory. The Court's reliance instead on a broad
and abstract ground of establishment warrants Reinhold Niebuhr's criticism that the Court used a meat-axe when it should
have used a scalpel. 86
The issue raised in Engel is symptomatic of the problem we
face in a religiously pluralistic society. Protestantism can no
longer claim a dominating position in shaping the American ethos.
It is understandable that practices such as prayers and Bible reading in public schools, which had their origin in days of Protestant
domination, should come under fresh scrutiny as the Court exercises its role of accommodating constitutional interpretation to the
changing social scene, although it would be refreshing to have
the Court acknowledge its creative and policy-making function in
this respect instead of making it appear that the result is required
either on the basis of a literal textual exegesis or by reference to
the intent of the Founding Fathers. The larger question, however, is whether and to what extent the government and its institutions may reflect a dominant religious consciousness of the community that has its roots in the nation's history and tradition.
Due regard for our religious pluralism as well as for the larger
pluralism that takes account of non-theistic ideologies and nonbelief requires that government, in any recognition it gives to
the dominant religious consciousness, carefully abstain from practices that in any significant way coerce conscience or otherwise impair minority rights. On the other hand, it is equally clear that
the Constitution, in establishing a secular state that cannot prescribe any official belief or creed for its citizens, whether theistic
or non-theistic and whether religious or political, does not require and, indeed, does not permit government to establish secularism or secular humanism as the nation's orthodoxy.
Religionists have ground for complaint if the public schools
by studied indifference teach that belief in God is irrelevant to
86 Niebuhr, The Court and the Prayer: A Dissenting Opinion, The New Leader,
July 9, 1962, p. 3.
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life. The Engel decision does not require such indifference.
Consistent with it the schools may follow practices and teaching
programs that help to create awareness, appreciation and understanding of the religious factor in the life of the nation and its
citizens. They may create respect for the moral values which reflect the community consensus and which illuminate the purposes
and processes of our democratic society. But it is not their responsibility or function to cultivate an official faith or ideology, whether
religious or humanistic in character, or to indoctrinate students
in any system of beliefs and values that rests on a claim of insight
into ultimate truth with respect to the meaning and purpose
of life. Parents who desire religious instruction for their children
as part of a school program have the option of sending them to
parochial schools. One effect of the school prayer decision is to
highlight the importance of private schools and of the parents'
freedom of choice in our free and pluralistic society that d(?eS not
recognize governmental monopoly of the educational process. But
the majority of Americans who are concerned with the relevancy
of religious teaching to the total educational program do not see
the parochial school as the answer to the problem. Their interest
may lie in the further development of dismissed- or released-time
programs in connection with the operation of the public school
systems. 87 Moreover, in view of the present impasse with respect
to the parochial school situation, it may well be that the sharedtime plan offers the greatest promise for reconciling the felt needs
for religious instruction with the secular limitations placed on the
public school systems. 88 All proposals of this kind deserve careful
study. Needless to say, any constructive solution to the problem
will require a generous measure of sympathetic understanding,
good will and tolerance on the part of all concerned elements
of the community.
Whatever the merits of plans for accommodating the educational system to programs of formal religious instruction, they
should not serve to obscure the fundamental consideration that
87 On the question whether in the light of the Engel case the Supreme Court will
continue to adhere to its decision in the Zorach case, sustaining the validity of a releasedtime program when conducted off the public school premises, see the discussion in
the text supra at 1045.
88 For a discussion of shared-time proposals whereby children will receive a part
of their instruction in parochial schools and a part in the public schools, see STAFF
OF HOUSE COMllU'ITEE ON EDUCATION .AND LABOR, 87TH CoNG., 2D SESS., PIONEER IDEALS
IN EDUCATION 55-59 (Comm. Print 1962); Cassels, A Way Out of Our Parochial-Public
School Conflict, Look, Aug. 28, 1962, p. 54; Symposium: Shared Time, 57 RELIGIOUS
EDUCATION 5 (1962).
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the cultivation of religious faith is the responsibility of home and
church. If secularism triumphs as the dominant American ideology, it will not be because of the Constitution or the Supreme
Court or because the public schools have failed in their limited
tasks, but because meaningful and vital religious faith has lost
its place in the hearts and lives of the people. The Engel decision
is a forceful reminder to parents and the churches that theirs is
the task and responsibility of making prayer, worship and religious
instruction rich and meaningful in the lives of their children.

